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Recent studies of individual attitudes toward immigration emphasize concerns about labor market 
competition as a potent source of anti-immigrant sentiment, in particular among less-educated or less-
skilled citizens who fear being forced to compete for jobs with low-skilled immigrants willing to work for 
much lower wages. We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 
European Social Survey. In contrast to predictions based upon conventional arguments about labor market 
competition, which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to 
their own, but support immigration of workers with different skill levels, we find that people with higher 
levels of education and occupational skills are more likely to favor immigration regardless of the skill 
attributes of the immigrants in question. Across Europe, higher education and higher skills mean more 
support for all types of immigrants. These relationships are almost identical among individuals in the 
labor force (i.e., those competing for jobs) and those not in the labor force. Contrary to the conventional 
wisdom, then, the connection between the education or skill levels of individuals and views about 
immigration appears to have very little, if anything, to do with fears about labor market competition. This 
finding is consistent with extensive economic research showing that the income and employment effects 
of immigration in European economies are actually very small. We find that a large component of the link 
between education and attitudes toward immigrants is driven by differences among individuals in cultural 
values and beliefs. More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater value on 
cultural diversity than their counterparts; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates 




Word Count (excl. tables): 11,153I.  Introduction 
Political debates over immigration policy have been rising in volume and intensity in recent years 
in almost all western economies. On the one hand, immigration is seen by many as an economic and 
cultural lifeline that can supply firms in key industries with skilled workers, relieve strains on tax-funded 
pension systems threatened by the graying of the local population, and inject new artistic and intellectual 
life into the nation. On the other hand, there are concerns that immigrants may take jobs away from local 
workers, subtract more from the government in the form of social services than they give back in taxes, 
and create ethnic enclaves that balkanize the nation, undermine traditional culture, and lead to crime and 
other social ills. These latter concerns have encouraged the recent imposition of much tighter immigration 
controls in several countries while also nurturing the growth of extremist anti-immigrant political 
movements in many parts of Europe and increasing the incidence of hate crimes directed toward 
immigrants. The debate seems certain to continue in the years ahead, and grow fiercer. 
A great deal of new research has examined survey data on individual attitudes toward 
immigration, focusing on the determinants of anti-immigration sentiments.
1 Some of the most recent and 
prominent studies have concluded that realistic fears about the economic effects of labor market 
competition among low skilled, blue-collar workers lie at the heart of much anti-immigration feeling.
2 
These studies all rest their analysis upon economic models of the distributive effects of immigration 
anticipating that low-skilled (i.e. less-educated) native workers will lose out when forced to compete for 
jobs with low-skilled immigrants.
3 The key supporting evidence for their claims is that opposition to 
immigration among survey respondents in OECD nations is negatively and significantly associated with 
individual levels of educational attainment. Viewed from this perspective, the immigration debate is to a 
large extent about economics, and a critical battle line is the one that separates high-skilled and low-
skilled workers.  
                                                      
1 See, for example, Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al. 1997; and Dustmann and Preston 2001. 
2 See, for example, Scheve and Slaughter 2001a and 2001b; Kessler 2001; and Mayda 2004. 
3 See Borjas 1999a and 1999b. 
  1But this account does not fit well with the growing body of evidence, available from a variety of 
studies of European and American labor markets, showing that the effects of immigration flows on 
income, employment, and unemployment actually appear to be quite small.
4 Since the most sophisticated 
economic models are quite equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages 
or employment opportunities of local workers, perhaps these latter results should not be so surprising. But 
this does raise a big question about how exactly we should interpret the very clear relationship between 
the education or skill levels among individuals and their views about immigration. One established line of 
scholarship would regard this pattern not as a reflection of labor market dynamics, but instead as 
confirmation that higher levels of education lead to greater ethnic and racial tolerance among individuals 
and more cosmopolitan outlooks.
5 Viewed in this light, immigration is an issue that raises fundamental 
questions about values and identities among individuals, debates over immigration are shaped less by 
labor market competition than by cultural conflict, and the division between more and less-educated 
natives is primarily a cultural or ideological distinction. 
Which of these interpretations is more correct? Is the main motivator for opposition to 
immigration the threat of economic competition, felt most acutely among the less educated? Or is it a 
deeper animosity toward foreigners and foreign cultures, felt least strongly among the more educated? 
The answer to this question is critical to our understanding of the politics of immigration and the 
treatment of ethnic minorities. It is crucial, too, for policymakers and others who support immigration and 
worry about the growth of extremist, often violent, anti-immigrant movements. If anti-immigration 
sentiments are based primarily upon economic calculations, there are some very direct ways in which 
policymakers might address them: for instance, by targeting forms of adjustment assistance and job 
creation programs toward the communities or industries in which the economic impact is felt most 
heavily. If opposition to immigration is motivated by more deep-seated cultural factors, on the other hand, 
                                                      
4 See Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Bhagwati 2000 and 2002; Dustmann et al. 2004; and Card 2004; although see 
Borjas 2003. 
5 See, for example, Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Citrin et al. 1997; and McLaren 2001. 
  2these types of adjustment assistance are unlikely to be effective and it is much more difficult to imagine 
simple, short-run measures that would mitigate the political tensions.  
We examine new data on attitudes toward immigration available from the 2003 European Social 
Survey (ESS). Unlike other sources of survey data on attitudes toward immigrants, the 2003 ESS provides 
a rich, detailed set of questions about the immigration issue, probing respondents’ views about 
immigrants from different countries. The detailed data allow us to provide new tests of the labor market 
competition explanation for anti-immigration sentiments among European voters. We focus, in particular, 
upon the complex relationship between education and attitudes toward immigration. Our results indicate 
that, in contrast to predictions based upon the conventional arguments about labor market competition, 
which anticipate that individuals will oppose immigration of workers with similar skills to their own, but 
support immigration of workers with different skill levels, people with higher education levels are more 
likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely skill attributes. 
Across Europe, higher education means more support for all types of immigrants. This is true for 
alternative measures of education in all 22 ESS countries. The same relationship holds for direct 
(occupational) measures of respondent skill levels: higher skills are associated with greater support for all 
types of immigration. And these relationships are almost identical among those in the labor force and 
those not in the labor force.  
The findings thus suggest that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the connection between the 
educational or skill attributes of individuals and their views about immigration appears to have very little, 
if anything, to do with fears about labor market competition. The conventional story appears to be based 
on a fundamental misinterpretation of the available evidence. We find that a large component of the effect 
of education on individual attitudes toward immigrants is associated with differences among individuals 
in cultural values and beliefs. More educated respondents are significantly less racist and place greater 
value on cultural diversity; they are also more likely to believe that immigration generates benefits for the 
host economy as a whole. Together, these factors account for around 65% of the estimated relationship 
between education and support for immigration.  
  3II.  Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration 
Which individuals are most likely to oppose immigration? Standard economic models of the 
income effects of immigration emphasize the importance of the different types of productive factors 
people own. What is critical in this respect is the impact that immigration has on relative supplies of 
factors of production in the local economy. In the most commonly analyzed scenario, it is assumed that 
immigrants have relatively low skill levels when compared with native workers. Immigration thus 
increases the supply of low-skilled labor relative to other factors (land, capital, and high-skilled labor). In 
a simple closed-economy model in which new (low-skilled) immigrants can only price themselves into 
employment by lowering the wages of native low-skilled workers; as more low-skilled labor is applied to 
fixed amounts of the other factors, the real wages of the less skilled will decline while the earnings of 
owners of land, capital, and skills will rise.
6 This model of the impact of immigration is often referred to 
as “factor-proportions” (FP) analysis.
7 It renders the distributive effects of inflows of low-skilled 
immigrants in stark terms: native low-skilled workers are clearly the economic losers.
 Of course, if 
immigrants were high-skilled (rather than low-skilled) workers the effect of the inflows would be to lower 
real wages for native high-skilled workers and to raise real earnings for all others (including low-skilled 
workers).  
There has been a good deal of research on public attitudes toward immigration that has looked for 
signs that economic concerns related to job security do lie behind anti-immigrant sentiments, with mixed 
results.
8 But several recent studies have set out explicitly to test the proposition that a fear of lower wages 
induces low-skilled individuals, in particular, to oppose immigration. Most prominently, Scheve and 
Slaughter (2001a, 2001b) have examined data from National Election Studies (NES) surveys in the 
                                                      
6 Standard models assume full employment and wage flexibility, so that the distributional effects are reflected in 
wages. In models that permit labor market imperfections, these effects can also take the form of changes in local 
unemployment rates (see Razin and Sadka 1995; Angrist and Kugler 2002). Alternative models also allow for 
geographic differences within national labor markets so that the wage and employment effects of immigration may 
be concentrated in “gateway communities” where immigrants tend to settle in large numbers (see Card 1990; and 
Borjas 1999a, 10-11). 
7 See Borjas et al. 1996 and 1997; and Borjas 1999a. 
8 See, for example, Studlar 1977; Harwood 1986; Simon 1987; Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994b; Citrin et al. 1997; 
Burns and Gimpel 2000; Fetzer 2000; and Dustmann and Preston 2001. 
  4United States in 1992, 1994, and 1996, that asked respondents about their preferences regarding 
immigration restrictions. They found that individuals with lower skills, measured primarily by years of 
education, were far more likely to support restrictions on immigration than those with higher skills. 
Mayda (2004) reached similar conclusions after examining cross-national survey data on 23 nations from 
the 1995 National Identity Module of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), as well as data 
on 44 nations from the third wave of the World Value Survey (WVS), conducted between 1995 and 1997. 
She reports that respondents with higher levels of skill (again, measured by years of education) are much 
more likely to voice pro-immigration opinions than those with lower levels of skill.  
  There are several reasons to be very cautious about how we interpret these findings. One issue is 
whether immigration, in practice, has actually had the distributional effects anticipated by the standard 
closed-economy models. A growing set of empirical studies dedicated to this question has found only 
very small wage and employment effects attributable to immigration flows into European labor markets 
(there is still much debate about the evidence in the American case).
9 In part this may be because there 
appears to be a great deal of variation in the skill levels of immigrants, and there is considerable debate 
now over whether immigrants actually tend, in general, to have low levels of skills relative to native 
workers.
10 To varying degrees, of course, the immigration policies in many western countries are actually 
aimed at selecting candidates for entry based upon the quality of their skills, and excess local demand for 
those skills.
11
  More fundamentally, the most sophisticated economic models are actually quite equivocal about 
whether immigrants will have an adverse impact on the wages or employment opportunities of local 
                                                      
9 For general reviews, see Friedberg and Hunt 1995; Bhagwati 2000, 2002. For evidence on the impact of 
immigration in European labor markets, see Zimmerman 1995, Hunt 1992, DeNew and Zimmerman 1994, 
Winkelman and Zimmerman 1993, Hartog and Zorlu 2002, and Dustmann et al 2004. Evidence on immigration 
effects on wages in the United States is discussed in Card 1990, Gang and Rivera-Batiz 1994a, Borjas et al 1997, 
and Borjas 1999a. Two recent studies of the effects of immigration on wages and employment in the United States, 
Borjas (2003) and Card (2004), reach opposing conclusions about the magnitude of these effects.  
10 Angrist and Kugler (2002, 16) report “considerable overlap between the immigrant and native schooling 
distributions” for 13 European countries in 1995 and 1999. Borjas et al. (1997) and Borjas (1999a) present evidence 
from U.S. Census data indicating that, on average, immigrants to the United States had approximately two fewer 
years of education than natives in 1998. According to Bhagwati (2002, 310), however, the evidence of a large native 
vs. immigrant skill difference is less clear judging from data from the Immigration and Naturalization Service.  
11 See Bauer et al. 2000. 
  5workers with similar skills.
12 In the following we briefly summarize the theoretical predictions of current 
open-economy models of immigration; we provide a detailed technical description in a separate appendix 
to this article.
13 In an open-economy Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model, trade can offset the impact of 
immigration as an economy adjusts to any change in factor supplies by importing less of the goods that 
can now be produced locally at a lower cost. Again assuming low-skilled immigrants, it is possible that an 
economy can absorb new workers simply by altering the mix of output of tradable goods, increasing 
production of low-skill-intensive goods and decreasing production of other goods (in line with the 
Rybcynski theorem). Wages will not change at all if the local economy is small enough that a change in 
its output mix has no effect on world prices – a result known as “factor price insensitivity.”
14 There are 
two possible exceptions. If the local economy is very large relative to the rest of the world, of course, the 
change in output mix can produce a decline in the world prices of low skill-intensive goods and a 
subsequent decline in the real wages of low-skilled labor. But this result does not seem applicable for the 
individual European countries. Alternatively, if the inflow of immigration is itself very large, it might 
induce a change in the set of tradable products that the local economy produces, thus causing a decline in 
the real wages of low-skilled labor. Yet this also seems like an extreme result, and not one that could be a 
reasonable basis for calculations about the effects of immigration in most European nations.  
The theoretical picture looks no clearer if we allow that the skills of workers can be highly 
“specific” to particular industries – the standard approach taken in most theoretical recent work on 
international trade.
15 If all goods are traded, so that prices are fixed in world markets, it can be shown that 
inflows of low-skilled workers will indeed lower real wages for low-skilled natives, while raising real 
wages for high-skilled workers in all industries (the latter benefits will be larger for high-skilled workers 
in sectors that use low-skilled labor more intensively). On the flip side, inflows of any type of high-skilled 
workers will raise real wages for low-skilled workers while lowering real wages for all high-skilled 
                                                      
12 See Friedberg and Hunt 1995; and Scheve and Slaughter 2001, 135-7. 
13 This supplement and other supplements referred to in later sections are available for download at the authors’ 
website at: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~jhainm/research.htm. 
14 Leamer and Levinsohn 1995. 
15 See Jones 1971; and Grossman and Helpman 1994. 
  6workers (the latter losses being larger for those who own the very same specific skills as the immigrants). 
While these distributive effects match the predictions generated by the simple closed-economy FP model, 
they are overturned with the inclusion of non-traded goods in the model. If immigration can lead to a 
reduction in the price of non-traded goods (i.e., if it raises the output of such goods more rapidly than it 
raises aggregate demand for them), it is unclear whether native workers with skills similar to those of 
immigrants will be worse off in real terms (the outcome will depend in part on their consumption tastes). 
And the effects of immigration inflows on real earnings are similarly ambiguous in the specific-factors 
model when the country in question is large relative to world markets.
16  
  Other types of general equilibrium models raise more doubts about the impact we should expect 
immigration to have on the wages of similarly skilled native workers. If we allow for economies of scale 
in production in the industries employing immigrants, inflows of new workers can be shown to generate 
higher real wages for native workers with similar skills in an open-economy model.
17 And if we treat 
immigration inflows as a component in the growth of the labor supply, in a fully-specified dynamic model 
of the economy, the impact of such flows on wages over time will depend on the rates of capital 
accumulation and population growth (and how these are affected by immigration), as well as the rate of 
skill acquisition among immigrants – points noted by Bhagwati (2000). All in all, it is extremely difficult 
to make firm predictions about the equilibrium effects of immigration on wages and employment 
opportunities among local workers.  
If the economic impact of immigration is actually quite small, as both theory and empirics tend to 
suggest, then what explains the strong negative association between education and anti-immigration 
sentiments? One clear explanation is provided by theories that relate education to higher levels of ethnic 
                                                      
16 Note that, while we have concentrated on the labor-market effects here, there is also considerable debate over the 
impact of immigration on government spending and tax revenues. One common concern is that low-skilled 
immigrants, since the tend to earn less and thus pay less in taxes than native, and since they are more likely to draw 
unemployment and other welfare benefits from government, are a net drain on government coffers. Economists are 
divided on whether this is actually the case (see Krugman and Obstfeld 2000, 166). Notice, however, that to the 
extent it is true, since the added tax burden of immigration would fall disproportionately upon richer, more highly 
skilled native workers, these distributional effects would run counter to (and thus mitigate) the types of distributional 
wage effects emphasized in closed-economy FP models of labor market competition. 
17 See Brezis and Krugman 1993. 
  7and racial tolerance among individuals and to a preference for cultural diversity. This is an interpretation 
favored by many scholars who have made note of the connection between education and individual 
support for immigration.
18 There is a large literature showing that education tends to socialize students to 
have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world.
19 As Gang et al. (2002, 13) note, most western 
educational systems are designed quite explicitly to increase social tolerance. And Chandler and Tsai 
(2001) point out that education fosters tolerance, not just by increasing students’ knowledge of foreign 
cultures and raising levels of critical thinking, but also by generating more diverse and cosmopolitan 
social networks, especially at the college level.
20 On a related theme, Betts (1988) has argued that support 
for immigration among the college-educated is one aspect of a larger class identity associated with 
cosmopolitanism and an appreciation for diverse cultures. We provide tests of these accounts in the 
analysis below. 
Note that, one might simply suggest that the actual economic effects of immigration are less 
relevant than people’s perceptions of those effects, and that perhaps stories reported by the media or 
statements made by politicians lead people to believe that immigration poses a larger economic threat to 
blue-collar workers than it actually does.
21 This type of assertion seems quite plausible, but it begs for a 
theoretical explanation for how and why individuals misperceive the threat posed by immigration. The 
most obvious explanation for people – and especially less-educated individuals – might be prone to seeing 
immigrants as an economic threat, no matter what the actual labor-market effects, would just seem to be 
an argument that links low education levels with xenophobic or racist predilections. That is, such an 
argument would seem ultimately to rest on the same (non-economic) cultural or ideological factors just 
discussed, and these factors become the critical determinants of anti-immigrant sentiments rather than the 
real economic effects of immigration. 
                                                      
18 See, for example, Betts 1988; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Citrin et al. 
1997; Fetzer 2000; Chandler and Tsai 2001; and Gang et al. 2002. 
19 See, for example, Campbell et al. 1960, 475-481; Erikson et al. 1991, 155-6; McClosky and Brill 1983; and 
Schuman et al. 1985. 
20 See Case et al. 1989; and Allport 1954. 
21 See Gang et al 2002, 7; and Citrin et. al 1997, 859. 
  8Besides tolerance and support for cultural diversity, of course, there are a variety of other non-
economic variables that have been identified as predictors of attitudes toward immigrants (and which are 
not so closely connected to education levels). Age tends to be negatively associated with support for 
immigration, for instance, and women seem generally more opposed to immigration than men.
22 Children 
of foreigners are predictably more supportive of immigration, as are members of minority ethnic 
groups.
23 The latter finding would appear to support claims that members of marginalized groups often 
form common political bonds.
24 Meanwhile, individuals with right wing or conservative political 
ideologies, and those evincing more national pride, are generally more likely to oppose immigration.
25 
Anti-immigration sentiment in Europe seems to be more intense in communities where immigrants are 
concentrated, suggesting that more contact with immigrants or perceived strains on locally provided 
government services foster nativist feelings.
26 We attempt to account for all of these possibilities in the 
empirical analysis below. 
III. New Data from the European Social Survey 
We draw our data from the fifth edition of the recently administered European Social Survey.
27 
The survey covers 22 European countries: Austria, France, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Britain, Belgium, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
Israel, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. It consists of answers of up to 42,000 respondents 
to an hour-long questionnaire, with an average country sample of about 2,000 respondents. The broad 
coverage provides substantial cross-national variation in social, political, and economic contexts. The 
stratified random sample was designed to be representative of the residential population of each nation, 
aged 16 years and above, regardless of their nationality, citizenship, or legal status.
28
                                                      
22 Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2000; and Gang et al. 2002. 
23 Citrin et al. 1997; and Chandler and Tsai 2001. 
24 Esphenshade and Calhoun 1993; and Betz 1994. 
25 Chandler and Tsai 2001. 
26 Gang et al. 2002. 
27 See Stoop et al. 2002. A detailed description of the survey can be found at http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org. 
28 The majority (55%) of the questionnaires were administered in face-to-face interviews. For a full discussion of the 
EES methodology, see Stoop et al. 2002.  
  9The questionnaire consists of a “core” module that contains a large range of socio-economic and 
demographic questions and several rotating, topic-specific modules, one of which focuses on the issue of 
immigration. Our primary empirical tests involve individual responses to a set of questions taking the 
following form: 
To what extent do you think [respondent’s country] should allow people from [source] to come 
and live here? 
 
Options:  ●   Allow many to come and live here 
● Allow  some 
●  Allow a few 
●  Allow none 
●  Don’t know 
 
There are four different versions of this question in which the source of the immigrants is identified 
alternatively as: 
●  the richer countries in Europe 
●  the poorer countries in Europe 
●  the richer countries outside Europe 
●  the poorer countries outside Europe 
 
For each of the questions we created a dichotomous variable that equals 1 (pro-immigration) if 
the answer was “allow many” or “allow some” and 0 (anti-immigration) if the answer was “allow a few” 
or “allow none.”
29 The dichotomous dependent variables just allow a simpler and more intuitive summary 
of the basic results than alternative treatments using the “raw” categorical variables and estimating 
ordered probit models (which would require reporting the marginal effects that each independent variable 
has on the probability of a response falling into each possible category). In section VI we describe the 
sensitivity analysis we have performed using ordered probit models and also re-running all the analysis 
reported below using all alternative cut-off points for dichotomization of the dependent variable. None of 
our findings is sensitive at all to the choice of cut-off point.    
 The crucial advantage gained from examining this ESS data, compared to data from alternative 
surveys used in previous research, is that separate questions have been posed about specific categories of 
                                                      
29 We excluded the few “don’t know” and missing answers from the sample. Including these observations as either 
pro- or anti-immigration answers does not change any of the substantive results we report since only 4-5% of the 
answers to each question fall in this category.  
  10immigrants that are likely to have very different skill characteristics. These distinctions allow for a much 
more direct test of the arguments about labor-market competition. Prior studies have rested on the 
assumption that respondents must always have low-skilled immigrants in mind when answering a general 
survey question about immigration.
30 Here we can assume that respondents will have substantially 
different expectations about the average skill levels of immigrants from “richer” countries than those from 
“poorer” countries. The questions were asked consecutively in the survey, making it very clear to 
respondents that “richer” versus “poorer” was the critical difference – a difference that is most obviously 
meaningful as it bears upon the expected skill levels of immigrants. Respondents are more likely to 
associate immigrants from the richer nations with higher-skilled individuals (e.g., professional and 
managerial employees from Germany, France, Britain, and the United States), while associating 
immigrants from poorer nations with lower-skilled individuals (e.g., manual workers and refugees from 
eastern and southern Europe and from Africa). This set of expectations seems intuitively compelling, but 
we can also verify that it is empirically very accurate. Immigrants from richer nations do have higher 
skills, on average, than immigrants from poorer nations. 
To verify this we examined evidence on the skill levels of immigrants compiled in the 
International File of Immigration Surveys (IFIS) database by van Tubergen (2004). This database 
combines survey data on more than 300,000 immigrants from 180 countries of origin and 18 destination 
countries, extracted from the European Union’s Labour Force Survey, national censuses, and additional 
country-specific immigrant surveys.
31 For the European destination nations the IFIS provides data on 
immigrants from 51 origins: 26 European and 25 non-European countries.
32 The data include codes for 
                                                      
30 Cf. Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 135. 
31 All surveys were harmonized and pooled by van Tubergen into a cross-national data set that provides comparable 
individual-level information on immigrants, classified by country of origin, for the period 1980-2001. To our 
knowledge this represents the most comprehensive data set on immigrant populations currently available. We are 
indebted to Frank van Tubergen for allowing us to use this data here. 
32 The 14 European destination nations in the IFIS database are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. In addition to these 14, 
the European origin countries included Albania, Bulgaria, Ex-Czechoslovakia, Ex-Yugoslavia, Hungary, Iceland, 
Italy, Malta, Norway, Poland, Romania, and Switzerland. The non-European origin nations are Algeria, Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, China, Cyprus, Egypt, Ex-Russia, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lebanon, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippine, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, the US, and Vietnam. 
  11whether the individual immigrants had low, middle, or high levels of educational attainment (these 
correspond, respectively, to whether the person had completed only primary or basic schooling, secondary 
schooling, or tertiary education).
33 For each of the 51 origin countries we were thus able to compute the 
proportion of immigrants to Europe in each education category. Here we present the main results of this 
analysis; more detailed results are available in are separate supplement to this article.
34 As expected, we 
found that the proportion of low (high) skilled immigrants is sharply decreasing (increasing) in origin 
country GDP per capita. In the case of immigrants from European origins, the correlation between origin 
GDP per capita and the proportion of low (high) education immigrants is -0.22 (0.16). This pattern is 
even more pronounced for immigration from non-European origins, where the respective correlations are 
-0.49 and 0.72. Parsing the data another way, if we take the average per capita GDP among origin 
countries in each sub-sample (i.e., European and non-European) as the dividing line between “richer” and 
“poorer” countries, the skill differences among immigrants from each category are substantial. For 
instance, the proportion of immigrants from poorer non-European countries that have low (high) 
educational levels is 0.50 (0.21), compared to 0.21 (0.48) for immigrants from richer countries. The 
differences between the skill levels of immigrants from richer and poorer nations are stark. Table 1 
reports the summary measures of the skill attributes of different categories of immigrants. 
[Table 1] 
  Thus, if concerns about labor-market competition are critical determinants of immigration 
preferences, given the large gap in average skills between immigrants from richer and poorer countries, 
we should expect that respondent skill levels should have a substantially different effect on answers to the 
ESS questions about immigration from richer and poorer countries. Respondent skill levels should have a 
large and positive effect on support for immigration from poorer countries, since these are predominantly 
low-skilled immigrants who compete for jobs with low-skilled natives. This is in line with the proposition 
                                                      
33 These categories match the EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT measure in the ESS data that we employ below 
with the exception that van Tubergen also includes Phds in the high education category rather than coding them 
separately. 
34 This supplement is available at the authors’ website. It provides a detailed breakdown of education levels in each 
ESS country and compares these with education levels of immigrants to ESS countries using the van Tubergen data. 
  12tested in previous studies. But respondent skill levels should have a substantially smaller, and perhaps 
even a negative, effect on support for immigration from richer countries, since these are predominantly 
high-skilled immigrants who are substitutes (rather than complements) to native workers with high skills. 
In Table 1 we have reported education levels of natives (the ESS sample) to compare with those of 
different types of immigrants. By this simple measure, immigrants from poorer countries (both from 
within and outside Europe) are, on average, less skilled than the ESS natives, while immigrants from 
richer countries are more highly skilled than natives. While these relationships can vary according to the 
education levels of natives within each particular ESS country, the large skill gap between immigrants 
from richer versus poorer nations is abundantly clear and the implications are straightforward: if labor-
market concerns are critical, the effects of individual skills levels on attitudes towards these different 
categories of immigrants should be markedly different. This is a simple, critical test for the labor-market 
competition account of anti-immigration sentiments.  
A summary of the ESS data on immigration preferences is reported in Table 2.
35 On average, 
survey respondents prefer European immigrants to non-Europeans (holding wealth constant), as perhaps 
we might expect, and they prefer immigrants from richer countries to those from poorer countries 
(holding “European-ness” constant).
36 The most preferred immigrants are thus those from richer 
European nations; the least preferred are from poorer countries outside Europe. Many different forces 
may be shaping these general preferences, of course, but it is interesting to note that they clash rather 
directly with a simple labor market competition story in at least one very clear way: since the average 
ESS respondent is more highly skilled than the average immigrant from poorer countries inside Europe, 
but has an even greater skill advantage over the average immigrant from poorer countries outside Europe, 
                                                      
35 Following the official ESS recommendation, we applied the design weight (DWEIGHT) to all estimations 
that examine single countries (all country specific averages and probit estimations) and both the design weight and 
the population weight (PWEIGHT) to all estimations where data is pooled across countries (full sample averages 
and probit estimations). See the ESS guidelines “Weighting European Social Survey Data” at 
http://ess.nsd.uib.no/2003/WeightingESS.pdf (retrieved 02/15/04). 
36 Difference-of-mean tests indicate that these differences for both the Europe vs. outside comparisons and for both 
of the rich vs. poor comparisons are highly significant (the lowest t-value in the four tests is 8.98), although the 
substantive differences are of course rather small. 
  13the distributional effects (on their own) would imply that the latter should be more preferred than the 
former on average. 
[Table 2] 
  Table 3 reports immigration preferences by country of respondent. Here we just provide the mean 
of each dichotomous dependent variable (indicating whether respondents supported immigration from 
each different source), and we have ranked the ESS countries according to per capita GDP. Overall, 
Sweden seems to be the most pro-immigrant country across the board, while Hungary is the most anti-
immigrant. Interestingly, respondents in Germany and Italy, nations often regarded as fertile soil for 
chauvinism and anti-foreigner movements (such as the Republikaner and the National Democratic Party 
in Germany or the Lega Nord in Italy), appear to look more favorably upon immigration, in general, than 
citizens in many other European nations. Other countries yield less of a surprise as for example Austria, 
with its strong right wing party (the Freiheitlichen), shows rather low support for immigration. Another 
interesting result is that respondents in Denmark appear to differentiate most strongly between types of 
immigrants, preferring “rich” over “poor” immigrants by larger margins than respondents elsewhere 
(given the recent success of the right-wing Folkeparti in Denmark, campaigning largely on opposition to 
poor immigrants, perhaps this should not be surprising).  
[Table 3] 
The general pattern in preferences is again rather inconsistent with the labor market competition 
argument. Assuming the skill level of the average respondent is increasing in per capita GDP across these 
countries, we should expect that (average) attitudes would become markedly less supportive of 
immigration from richer vs. poorer nations at higher levels of per capita GDP. While it does seem to be 
the case that the preference for immigrants from richer vs. poorer nations is largest in ESS countries with 
the lowest levels of per capita GDP, that same preference still appears in many of the most developed 
ESS countries (e.g., Luxembourg, Denmark, Italy, UK, Germany, Finland, etc.). In fact, in all countries 
expect Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland, richer immigrants are preferred to poorer ones 
or people (on average) are essentially indifferent between the two. 
  14Previous studies of opinion data on immigration have typically been severely constrained by the 
absence of good measures of key variables and theoretically relevant controls, since the surveys 
generating the data were not focused explicitly upon the immigration issue. The ESS allows us to 
overcome these problems to a substantial degree, since it provides multiple measures of a wide array of 
critical socioeconomic, demographic, and attitudinal variables. In the next sections we incorporate a large 
variety of these variables when estimating the probability of support for different types of immigration 
among individual survey respondents. Our principal goal, which we address immediately in the next 
section, is to provide a rigorous new set of tests of the labor market competition explanation for anti-
immigration sentiments. We also investigate alternative explanations of attitudes toward immigration that 
focus upon cultural conflict. 
IV. Labor Market Competition and Anti-Immigration Views? 
 
  A. Benchmark Model 
To provide a basic test of the conventional labor market competition argument, we begin by 
estimating a series of probit models for the dichotomous dependent variables described above (indicating 
support for immigration from different types of source countries). We employ the two indicators of 
individual levels of education that have been applied as proxy measures of individual skill levels in 
previous studies: the first measure, YEARS OF SCHOOLING, simply counts the total number of years of 
full time education completed by the respondent; the second measure, which we label EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT, is a categorical indicator of the highest level of education attained by the respondent, 
adjusted by the ESS to allow for differences between the various European educational systems so that 
the results are comparable across countries.
37 (See Appendix for complete descriptive statistics for all 
variables described here and used in the analysis). 
We include the standard socioeconomic and demographic control variables in an otherwise 
streamlined “benchmark” model. These variables include the respondent’s AGE, (in years), GENDER 
                                                      
37 The coding is: 0=Not completed primary education; 1=completed primary or first stage of basic education; 
2=Completed lower secondary or second stage of basic education; 3=completed upper secondary; 4=post secondary, 
non-tertiary; 5=first stage of tertiary; and 6=completed second stage of tertiary education. 
  15(1=female, 0=male), and INCOME (measured on a categorical scale from 1 to 12).
38 We include whether 
the respondent is a NATIVE of his or her country of residence (1=born in country; 0=foreign born), for 
obvious reasons. To account for “neighborhood” effects, we include a measure of how many people of a 
minority race or ethnic group are living in the area where the respondent currently resides, which we refer 
to as MINORITY AREA (1=almost nobody, 2=some, 3=many).
39 In addition, since far-right parties in 
Europe have typically been the most vocal opponents of immigration, we also account for the RIGHT 
PARTISAN political orientation of each respondent (measured on a scale from 0=left to 10=right).
40 Each 
of the estimations also includes a full set of country fixed effects.
41 The results for the simple, benchmark 
model are displayed in Table 4. To facilitate interpretation, rather than showing estimated probit 
coefficients, we report simulated marginal effects; i.e., the change in the estimated probability of being 
pro-immigration associated with a unit increase in the value of the relevant regressor (holding all other 
regressors at their sample means). For dichotomous variables the discrete change in the probability is 
shown. 
[Table 4] 
  Recall that, if the labor market competition effects are critical determinants of immigration 
preferences, and education measures respondent’s skill levels, then education should be strongly and 
positively linked with support for immigration from poorer countries, but a much weaker (and perhaps 
                                                      
38 Since individual income is correlated with education, one could make the case for excluding it from the 
benchmark model when assessing aggregate effects of educational attainment on attitudes toward immigrants. 
Mayda (2004) and Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) estimated models with and without an income control. We report 
estimations including income here, but have replicated all the analysis after excluding the income variable – the 
results (available from the authors) are virtually identical. The coding for income is: 1=less than 150 Euro monthly; 
2= 150-300 Euro; 3=300-500; 4=500-1000; 5=1000-1500; 6=1500-2000; 7=2000-2500; 8=2500-3000; 9=3000-
5000; 10=5000-7500; 11=7500-10000; 12=>10000. 
39 This is based on the question asking respondents: “How would you describe the area where you currently live?” 
Answers are coded: 1=almost nobody (of minority race or ethnic group), 2=some, 3=many. 
40 The ESS question is: “In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right.’ Using this card, where would you 
place yourself on this scale?” The answers are coded on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). A potential problem with 
this variable is that what means “left” and “right” in the Britain might differ markedly from what those same terms 
mean in, say, Poland. However, as we discuss in sensitivity analysis (see section VI below) none of our substantive 
results are affected by the inclusion, exclusion, or re-centering of this control (by country means). 
41 We estimate all models using robust standard errors, adjusted for potential within-region clustering. We also re-
estimated all models clustering standard errors by countries only (omitting the fixed effects), and the results are 
substantively identical. 
  16even negatively) related to support for immigration from richer countries. The critical finding from the 
estimations of the benchmark model is that, contrary to these expectations, people with higher education 
are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from. The estimated 
effects of education are always positive, statistically significant, and quite large in magnitude across all 
the dependent variables. For example, a shift from the lowest to the highest level of educational 
attainment increases the predicted probability of favoring immigration from poorer European (non-
European) countries by 0.35 (0.35) holding all other variables at their sample means. Contrary to 
expectations, the corresponding effect is even slightly larger for immigration from richer European (non-
European) countries, with the increase in educational attainment raising the predicted probability of 
support for immigration by 0.35 (0.36). But the critical finding is that the positive relationship between 
education and attitudes toward immigrants from richer versus poorer nations is virtually identical (all the 
four 0.90 confidence intervals overlap for both educational attainment and schooling). These results raise 
serious questions about the importance of labor market considerations in shaping individual attitudes 
toward immigration. The evidence fits much better with alternative accounts that relate the effects of 
education on support for immigration to greater tolerance and improved understanding of foreign cultures 
and a taste for cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity, and expect that such effects are always positive 
and are not sensitive to expected immigrant skill levels.  
The estimated marginal effects of the control variables are significant at the 0.99 confidence level 
in the majority of cases and enter the model with signs anticipated based upon previously reported 
findings. The respondent’s AGE is generally negatively related to support for immigration, although this 
relationship is not terribly robust.
42 Higher INCOME is associated with favoring immigration. Living in a 
MINORITY AREA is positively correlated with the probability of favoring immigration from poorer, but 
not from richer countries. Foreign-born respondents are more likely than their NATIVE counterparts to 
favor immigration. People with more RIGHT PARTISAN political orientations are more likely to oppose 
                                                      
42 Following Dustmann and Preston (2001) we also experimented with a second order polynomial term here. We 
found some indication that the age effect may indeed be weakly U-shaped. However, this effect was so small that we 
excluded it from the benchmark model. Adding it does not change any of our results. 
  17immigration in general, and this relationship is stronger (and more robust) when it comes to immigrants 
from poorer versus richer countries. The only variable that has a somewhat different relationship with 
attitudes toward immigration from rich countries versus poor nations is GENDER: women are 
significantly more likely than men to oppose immigrants from richer countries, but there is apparent 
difference between men and women when it comes to attitudes toward immigration from poorer 
countries. Again this seems to provide evidence inconsistent with a simple job competition account of 
attitudes toward immigration. Women respondents tend to have lower skill levels than men, on average, 
in the European economies: the average number of years of schooling among men in the ESS sample is 
12.1, compared to 11.5 for women. Even controlling for formal education qualifications, female workers 
tend to be under-represented in higher-skilled occupations.
43 If labor market motivations were really 
critical here in shaping attitudes toward immigration, we would expect just the opposite of what we have 
found: that is, women would be more opposed to (low-skilled) immigrants from poorer countries than 
men, and more supportive than men of (high-skilled) immigrants from richer countries.
44
  B. Country-Specific Estimations  
One possible objection to the analysis of the benchmark model above is that it does not allow the 
relationship between individual skill levels and immigration preferences to vary with national factor 
endowments (i.e., the local abundance of skilled relative to unskilled labor). The ESS data is extensive 
enough that we can address this issue very directly: we can estimate a full series of country-specific 
models of immigration preferences and obtain quite precise estimates of the link between education and 
attitudes in each of the 22 individual ESS countries. Table 5 summarizes the results from these 
estimations. It reports the marginal effects for YEARS OF SCHOOLING and EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT when the benchmark model is estimated using responses to the immigration questions in 
                                                      
43 See Estevez-Abe, Iversen, and Soskice 2001. 
44 A reviewer suggested that the female preference for immigration from poorer nations may be driven by feelings of 
compassion for poorer migrants that are felt more acutely by women than by men. On the other hand, it may reflect 
greater demand among women for (low-skilled) household help. We have experimented with a gender-income 
interaction term in hopes of testing the “household help” proposition, finding that, contrary to what it presumably 
implies, the gender gap in attitudes toward immigrants does not vary significantly across levels of income. 
  18each ESS country.
45 The countries are again ranked according to levels of GDP per capita to provide for 
easy comparisons across countries with different factor endowments. 
[Table 5] 
  If labor market competition is a critical determinant of attitudes toward immigration we should 
expect the positive relationship between respondent skill levels and support for immigration from poorer 
countries to be stronger in magnitude in ESS countries with higher levels of GDP per capita (i.e. those 
with greater skill abundance), since the standard models suggest that any distributional effects associated 
with inflows of low-skilled labor should be larger where low-skilled labor is more scarce. But again we 
should expect the relationship between individual skill levels and support for immigration from richer 
countries to be much smaller in magnitude in all cases, if not actually negative. The findings do not fit 
well with these expectations. All (that is, 176 out of 176) of the estimated marginal effects of the 
education variables are positive. All but 13 (that is, almost 93%) are statistically significant, most of them 
at the 0.99 level, and most are quite large in terms of their estimated increase in the probability of support 
for immigration.
46 For example, in the case of immigration from richer European countries the increase in 
the predicted probability of being pro-immigration associated with a change from the lowest to the 
highest level of educational attainment ranges from 0.17 in Greece to 0.53 in the UK. Comparing the links 
between education and the support for immigration from richer countries and (the corresponding) poorer 
countries, in only 39 of 88 cases are the relationships between education and pro-immigration attitudes for 
richer country immigrants actually smaller in magnitude than the respective relationships for poorer 
country immigrants. In not one of these 39 cases is the difference statistically significant (at the 0.90 
level). That is, in terms of finding the anticipated, marked difference in the relationship of individual 
                                                      
45 Detailed results from all country-specific regressions as well as replication data and accompanying code for all 
other results shown in this article are available at authors’ website. 
46 The last row in the table counts the number of significant coefficients if the INCOME variable, the central 
bottleneck in terms of number of observations for most countries, is replaced by a variable measuring satisfaction 
with the current level of household income. The latter variable yields on average about 20-40% more observations 
per country. (The question reads: “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your 
household’s income nowadays?” Coding: 1=Living comfortably on present income; 2=Coping on present income; 
3=Finding it difficult on present income; 4=Finding it very difficult on present income). According to this 
specification, even 166 or 94% of the estimated marginal effects are significant at conventional levels, due to the 
larger number of observations. 
  19skills and attitudes towards different types of immigrants, the results are zero out of 88. The central 
message here is that, among individuals across Europe, more education means more support for all types 
of immigration and this relationship is not affected by expected immigrant skill levels.  
The job competition argument fares no better when we examine variation in the magnitude of the 
education effects across the ESS countries. Figure 1 plots the marginal effect of education on immigration 
preferences in each country against per capita GDP.
47 While the size of the marginal effect of education 
on support for immigration from poorer nations rises with GDP per capita, as expected, the positive 
relationship between education and support for immigration from richer nations is almost identical and 
rises in magnitude with GDP per capita even somewhat more rapidly.
48 High-skilled individuals favor 
higher-skilled immigrants even more than do low-skilled respondents, and this difference is more 
pronounced in more skill-abundant economies. As the scissoring of the lines of (linear) best fit in Figure 1 
show, education has a larger marginal effect on support for low-skilled rather than high-skilled 
immigration in the most skill-scarce economies, and the reverse in the most skill-abundant economies, a 
pattern that makes no sense at all in terms of the labor competition account.
49
[Figure 1]  
  C. Alternative Measures of Individual Skill Levels 
Perhaps using education as a general indicator of labor market skills, rather than more specific 
measures related to the occupations of individual respondents, creates a problem for tests of the labor 
market competition argument? We can address this concern by substituting the measures of education we 
have used above with alternative measures of skills. The most straightforward approach involves using 
                                                      
47 Here we follow the approach used by Mayda (2004), who argued that the positive association between the size of 
the education effect and GDP per capita across countries supported the job competition account.  
48 The correlation between the magnitude of the education effect (based on educational attainment) and GDP per 
capita is 0.24 (0.19) in the case of immigration from richer European (non-European) countries. These correlations 
increase to 0.45 (0.48) if the GDP per capita outlier Luxembourg is excluded from the sample. The respective 
correlations for immigration from poorer European (non-European) countries are 0.02 (0.07) for the full sample and 
0.22 (0.31) excluding Luxembourg. 
49 Further research might examine whether in fact the country-specific effects of education are related in any 
systematic way to immigration policies across European countries, or to the actual skill (or ethnic) composition of 
immigration inflows, labor market regulations, welfare policies, or educational systems. One clear possibility is that 
education differs in political content across nations in ways that matter for immigration policy preferences.  
  20the occupations of currently employed respondents – coded by ESS according to the International Labour 
Organization’s ISCO88 classification scheme – to distinguish individual skill levels. The ISCO88 scheme 
groups specific occupations into four skill categories: (1) elementary occupations or manual labor; (2) 
plant and machine operators and assemblers, craft and related trades workers, skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers, service workers and shop and market sales workers, and clerks; (3) technicians and 
associate professionals, and; (4) professionals. We follow O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001) in using the 
ISCO88 occupational codes to identify a fifth skill category – legislators, senior officials and managers – 
that presumably includes only highly skilled individuals.
50 Again following O’Rourke and Sinnott (2001), 
we first use these categories to create a dichotomous skill variable, called SKILL345, that provides a 
basic distinction between high and low-skilled workers (1=ISCO88 category 3, 4, or 5; 0=ISCO88 
category 1 or 2).
51 We also create a full set of dummy variables, SKILL*, indicating whether the 
respondent fits into the particular ISCO88 skill category (1= skill category *; 0=otherwise).  
[Table 6] 
Table 6 reports the results when we re-estimate the benchmark model, substituting the measures 
of education with SKILL345 and then with the four SKILL* dummy variables. Again, the results run 
counter to what a job competition account would expect. Higher skills are robustly associated with greater 
support for all types of immigration regardless of whether we use the dichotomous variable or the 
individual skill dummies, and this relationship is not sensitive to expected immigrant skill levels. Again, 
contrary to expectations, the relationships between individual skills and support for immigrants from 
richer countries are not significantly different (and are actually slightly larger) than the corresponding 
relationship between education support for immigration from poorer countries.
52  
                                                      
50 The few (179) members of the armed forces are excluded since no ISCO88 skill level is defined for this group. 
51 Note that this is the same variable Mayda (2004) used in her analysis of the ISSP survey data. Rather than using 
occupational distinctions themselves, Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) tried a measure of the average wage for each 
respondent’s occupation (assuming average wages reflect skill levels) in place of education. 
52 We also estimated the effect of skill level (based on SKILL345) for individual countries and found substantively 
identical results: the skill variable has a positive impact in all countries (84 of 84 estimated coefficients are positive) 
and in 89% of cases the effect is statistically significant. And in no case is the effect of education on support for 
immigrants from richer nations significantly smaller (at the 0.99 level) than the corresponding effect for immigrants 
  21We get substantively identical results if we include measures of education and (occupational) 
skill levels in the same estimates. These measures are strongly correlated, as expected, but they are not 
identical: the pair-wise correlation between YEARS OF SCHOOLING and SKILL345 is 0.47, while the 
correlation between EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT and SKILL345 is 0.52. The correlation breaks 
down in the higher skill categories, as a considerable number of people with low levels of formal 
education possess jobs classified as high skilled (e.g., managers without university degrees). The results 
from the amended form of the benchmark model are shown in Table 7. Again, the effects of individual 
education and skill levels on support for immigrants from richer countries are not significantly different 
than the corresponding effects on support for immigration from poorer countries.
53 Both SKILL345 and 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT seem to have distinct (positive) conditional relationships with support 
for immigration, as both variables are highly significant predictors across all models.
54 Including the skill 
variable leaves the positive effect of education substantively unaffected. The education effect appears to 
be much larger in substantive terms than the skill effect in all models. For example, in the case of 
immigration from richer (poorer) European countries, a change from the lowest level of educational 
attainment to the highest (with all other variables at the means) is associated with an increase in the 
probability of being pro-immigration by 0.30 (0.31). The corresponding gain, when changing from low to 
high skills, is only 0.09 (0.08). Interestingly, compared to the models without SKILL345, the magnitude 
of the education effect in the combined models decreases only very slightly. Thus, again for immigration 
from richer (poorer) non-European countries, only about 14% (11%) of the more general education effect 
                                                                                                                                                                           
from poorer nations. Note that France is omitted here due to missing occupational data (hence we end up with 21 
countries and 84 coefficients). Full results are available from the authors. 
53 As expected, multicollinearity does seem to produce a small increase in the standard errors for the estimated 
effects when both education and skill variables are included together in the same models (compare to standard errors 
in Tables 4 and 6 above), but this makes no difference to the findings: the 95% confidence intervals would be 
overlapping across the models even if the standards errors were reduced by half! 
54 All these, and other results reported below, are substantively the same if we use years of schooling as the 
education proxy. 
  22appears to be accounted for by skill differences (the total uncontrolled education effect decreases by 0.05 
(0.04) once SKILL345 is included).
55  
[Table 7] 
  The same holds true if individual skill dummies are included instead of SKILL345. Again, all 
except one of the skill dummies enter positively and highly significant across all models. It is clear that, 
when we include the more fine-grained indicators of skills, the estimated association between 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT and attitudes is not substantively different than when we employed the 
dichotomous SKILL345 measure. 
  D. Additional Tests: Employment Status and Non-linear Education Effects   
One additional test of the labor market competition account, following Scheve and Slaughter 
(2001a, 141) and Mayda (2004, 12), involves examining whether the effects of education (or skill) levels 
on the attitudes of respondents in the labor force differ significantly from the effects of these variables 
among those not currently in the labor force. In particular, we might expect that concerns about labor 
market competition should only be observable among those currently in the labor force and thus sensitive 
to the immediate effects of immigration on wage rates. To check for this possibility we split the ESS 
sample into sub-samples, distinguishing those in the labor force (including the temporarily unemployed) 
from those not in the labor force (students, the disabled, those who are retired, and those caring for 
children at home). We also break down the labor force sub-sample to examine just those who are 
unemployed and those among the unemployed who say they are actively looking for work – these last two 
groups of respondents are the ones, presumably, in which concerns about the impact of immigrants on 
competition for jobs should be the most acute. We estimated our benchmark model for all these sub-
samples. The results are reported in Table 8, which displays just the estimated education effects in the 
different sub-samples.  
                                                      
55 Recall that in the models without skill, the total shift in probability associated with a change from the lowest to 
highest level of educational attainment was 0.35 (0.35). Cf. Table 4. We do need to exercise some caution with this 
direct comparison, as the estimations reported in Table 7 have slightly fewer observations than those in Table 4 (due 
to missing data for the SKILL345 variable). However, when we re-estimate the models shown in Table 4 using just 
the sub-sample available for the analysis shown in Table 7 we get substantively identical results.  
  23[Table 8] 
Comparing the results across sub-samples, as well as those for the full ESS sample, we find no 
meaningful or significant differences in the estimated relationship between education and attitudes toward 
immigration. Comparing in-labor-force and out-of-labor-force respondents, and looking at the estimated 
effects for each model, the point estimates are very similar in each case and the 0.90 confidence intervals 
for all the marginal effects are overlapping.
56 And the estimated effects across models (for immigrants 
from richer versus poorer countries) are almost identical in each sub-sample. If we focus on the 
unemployed, there is still no support for the notion that fears about competition for jobs are driving 
attitudes towards immigrants. Across the models, the association between education and the probability of 
being pro-immigration is not significantly stronger among the unemployed than among other respondents, 
including those who are out of the labor force altogether. Nor are there significant differences in the 
effects on attitudes toward immigrants from richer and poorer countries among the unemployed (if 
anything, the estimated effects of education appear to be larger when it comes to explaining attitudes 
toward immigrants from richer versus poorer countries, the opposite of the pattern we would anticipate if 
job market concerns, and thus expected differences in the skills immigrants, were critical). This is true 
even for unemployed respondents who say they are actively looking for work. These findings speak 
strongly against the notion that concerns about job competition are a primary driving force in determining 
attitudes towards immigration. 
Finally, following Chandler and Tsai (2001), we have re-estimated our benchmark model while 
allowing for nonlinearities in the relationship between education and attitudes. The standard tests of the 
labor competition model all simply assume that attitudes are a linear function of education, measured on 
any cardinal scale such as YEARS OF SCHOOLING or EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT linearity seems 
                                                      
56 Here our results clash directly with those reported by Scheve and Slaughter (2001a, 142) and Mayda (2004, 13), 
who find that the education effect on attitudes toward immigration is significantly larger among respondents in the 
labor force than among those not in the labor force. Beyond the difference in data sets, it is difficult to speculate 
about possible reasons for this divergence. We have experimented with various specifications and with various ways 
of defining the sub-samples (e.g., including or excluding all students and all unemployed individuals from the labor 
force sub-sample, comparing those in work with only retirees), but the substantive findings remain the same. The 
results are the same, too, when we estimated all these models including both education and skills measures. 
  24an appropriate assumption given the way skill levels are expected to affect wages and preferences in the 
standard economic models. To test whether the relationship between education and attitudes toward 
immigration actually takes this simple form, we created a full set of dummy variables for each different 
level of education that a respondent could have attained, as coded in the ESS data: ELEMENTARY 
(1=completed primary or first stage of basic education; 0=otherwise), HIGH SCHOOL (1=completed 
upper secondary schooling; 0=otherwise), COLLEGE (1=completed first stage of tertiary education; 
0=otherwise), and PHD  (1=completed second stage of tertiary education; 0=otherwise). This coding is 
based on the UNESCO’s ISCED97 classification of educational systems that is designed to account for 
the different types of educational systems across countries.
57 We simply re-estimated the benchmark 
model incorporating the dummy variables in place of the standard measures of education employed above 
(the excluded category refers to respondents who did not finish elementary schooling). The results are 
shown in Table 9. 
[Table 9] 
It seems very clear that there are substantial nonlinearities in the relationship between education 
and attitudes toward immigrants. Confirming the results Chandler and Tsai (2001) report using separate 
data on U.S. respondents, we find that college education has far greater positive effects on support for 
immigration than high school education, and finishing elementary schooling actually appears to have 
negative effects on support for immigration. In the case of immigration from richer (poorer) non-
European countries, for instance, holding all other covariates at their sample means, completing college 
education shifts the probability of being pro-immigration by 0.18 (0.17) as compared to only 0.04 (and an 
insignificant 0.02) for high school education; while finishing elementary schooling reduces the 
probability of being pro-immigration by 0.08 (0.09). High school education is not a robust predictor of 
immigration preferences. There appears to be a very clear plateau effect here, with exposure to university 
education being the critical contributor to the generally positive relationship between education and 
support for immigration. If we run the benchmark model using YEARS OF SCHOOLING on two sub-
                                                      
57 Details can be found at http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/isced/ISCED_A.pdf (Retrieved 12/28/05). 
  25samples – those who completed college and those who only completed high school – we find very distinct 
results: in the case of immigration from richer (poorer) European countries, for instance, the marginal 
effect of an additional year of schooling on the probability of being pro-immigration is only 0.009 (0.014) 
among college graduates as compared to 0.024 (0.026) among high school graduates. 
This plateau effect associated with exposure to university education seems out of place with the 
simple story about labor market competition and its effects on immigration preferences. It would appear 
to fit much better with alternative approaches to explaining attitudes toward immigration that focus on 
cultural values and identity and the way they are related to education: college curricula and the 
intellectual and social environment cultivated in most modern universities do typically emphasize the 
virtues of tolerance and cultural diversity, and provide students with access to a cosmopolitan network of 
teachers and fellow students.
58  
V. Education, Cultural Values, and Attitudes Toward Immigration 
 
  The tests above indicate that the clear association between education levels and individual 
support for immigration (of both high and low skilled workers) is simply not consistent with the standard 
labor market competition argument. We now explore whether the relationship might be better accounted 
for by alternative claims about the way education generates greater ethnic and racial tolerance among 
individuals and more cosmopolitan outlooks. To do so, we employ an array of different measures of 
individuals’ values and beliefs available in the ESS data. We choose a set of measures most similar to 
those used in previous studies that have examined the importance of values.
59 We employ a measure we 
call ANTIHATE (coded from 0 to 10), reflecting the degree to which respondents’ would support a 
general law against actions promoting racial or ethnic hatred.
60 We also include a measure of support for 
MULTICULTURALISM (coded from 1 to 5), indicating the degree to which respondents disagreed with 
                                                      
58 See Case et al. 1989; and Betts 1988. 
59 See, for example, Citrin et al. 1997; and Chandler and Tsai 2001. 
60 The ESS question is: “How good or bad are each of these things for a country? … A law against promoting racial 
or ethnic hatred.” The answers are coded on a scale from 0=extremely bad, to 10=extremely good. 
  26the notion that it was better for his or her country if everyone shared the same customs and traditions.
61 
To examine feelings about immigrants specifically, we include a measure of how many IMMIGRANT 
FRIENDS a respondent has (1=none, 2=a few, 3=several).
62 We also employ an index of the degree to 
which each respondent believes that immigration enriches the CULTURE of his or her native country 
(also coded from 0 to 10).
63 And, finally, we use a measure of the extent to which respondents believe 
immigration worsens CRIME problems in the native country (coded on a scale from 0 to 10), since this 
appears to capture a rather negative stereotype of foreigners or outsiders.
64 Table 10 reports the 
correlations between these variables and the measures of education. As expected, more educated 
respondents are significantly more likely to have immigrant friends, place greater value on cultural 
diversity, and are less likely to think that immigrants worsen crime problems. 
[Table 10] 
Next we re-estimate our benchmark model, incorporating each of these new “values” variables 
one-at-a-time and examining both how they are related to immigration preferences and the degree to 
which adding each new variable reduces the residual effect of education levels on attitudes. One issue 
here is whether it is appropriate to think of these new variables as exogenous causes of opposition to 
immigration. This concern is perhaps clearest when considering whether respondents have immigrants as 
friends and if they believe that immigrants enrich the culture and have no effect on crime. These may 
simply be regarded as characteristics or attitudes that, while associated with pro-immigration preferences, 
do not actually generate or affect such preferences. In any case, we do not attempt here to provide a 
conclusive test of the alternative causal theories (cited in section II) linking values such as tolerance and 
                                                      
61 The ESS question is: “Please tell me how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements …It is better 
for a country if almost everyone shares the same customs and traditions.” The answers are coded on a scale from 
1=agree strongly, to 5=strongly disagree. 
62 This measure is based on the question: “Do you have any friends who have come to live in [respondent’s country] 
from another country?” The answers are originally coded: 1=Yes, several; 2=Yes, a few; 3=No, none at all. We have 
recoded these along more intuitive lines. 
63 The ESS question is: “Would you say that [respondent’s country’s] cultural life is generally undermined or 
enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?” The answers are coded on a scale from 0=Cultural 
life undermined, to 10=Cultural life enriched. 
64 The question is: “Are [respondent’s country’s] crime problems made worse or better by people coming to live 
here from other countries?” The answers are originally coded on a scale from 0=crime problems made worse, to 
10=crime problems made better. We have recoded these along more intuitive lines. 
  27appreciation for cultural diversity to views about immigration. We aim only to test whether the available 
measures of these values are strongly associated with immigration preferences as anticipated by the 
theories. Sorting out the causal issues is beyond the scope of our paper and would require a very different 
research design.
65 (Note that we do conduct very specific tests, reported in section VI below, to be sure 
that the values and beliefs variables are not endogenous to labor market concerns among respondents). 
Table 11 presents the results of the new estimations. We have estimated these models for all of 
the dependent variables, but for brevity here we only report the results for attitudes toward immigrants 
from poorer European countries.
66 Each of the cultural value variables is significantly associated with 
attitudes toward immigration in the anticipated direction (with coefficients indicating substantively large 
effects). Respondents who are more tolerant (as measured by ANTIHATE) and report higher values on 
MULTICULTURALISM are more likely to support immigration, as are those who have more 
IMMIGRANT FRIENDS and those who feel that immigration enriches rather than undermines the 
national CULTURE. Concerns that immigration worsens CRIME problems are associated with 
opposition to immigration. These non-economic variables have significant associations with immigration 
attitudes across all models (and the relationships are stronger, in each case, for attitudes toward 
immigration from poorer versus richer nations – not shown here). The pattern suggests that people 
differentiate between immigrants not primarily according to the level of their skills, and the 
corresponding threat they pose to respondents’ wages, but rather along cultural or other non-economic 
dimensions. 
[Table 11] 
The results indicate that the division between more and less-educated natives over support for 
immigration is primarily a distinction in values. As each cultural variable is added to the model the 
                                                      
65 To provide more rigorous tests of causal arguments, it would seem imperative to have multi-year panel data on 
individuals so that one could examine the sequenced effects of changes in values on attitudes toward immigrants in a 
differences-in-differences design. Using the available (cross-sectional) ESS data, one could presumably try to 
identify instrumental variables for the values in question, but we doubt whether reliable exogenous instruments 
could be found here. 
66 Full results from all the estimations are available from the authors.  
  28estimated relationship between education and pro-immigration attitudes decreases in magnitude while the 
explanatory power of the model increases. In the most extensive model (column 6), the magnitude of the 
(residual) education effect is decreased to the extent that shifting from a respondent with the lowest to the 
highest level of education (with all other variables at their means) increases the probability of being pro-
immigration by only 0.15, as compared with 0.35 for the benchmark model (column 1). The measured 
differences in cultural values across respondents thus appear to account for some 57% of the uncontrolled 
education effect. 
What else, besides these types of values, might be reflected in the residual effect that education is 
having on attitudes toward immigration? One strong possibility is that it may reflect the fact that more 
educated respondents are more informed about the overall efficiency gains associated with economic 
integration in general.
67 The ESS includes a good proxy that seems to capture beliefs about the general 
welfare effects of immigration. The measure is based on the degree to which each respondent thinks 
immigration is good for his or her country’s ECONOMY as a whole (coded on a scale from 0 to 10).
68 
This variable is correlated in a positive fashion with education levels, as expected: the correlation between 
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT (YEARS OF SCHOOLING) and ECONOMY is 0.20 (0.18).  
Table 11 (column 7) reports the results when we include this additional variable in the most 
extensive of the “values” models estimated above, again focusing on immigration from poor European 
source countries.
69 Whether individuals believe immigration implies welfare gains for the ECONOMY as 
a whole is significantly and positively linked to support for immigration. Interestingly, this economic 
literacy effect is larger for the case of immigration from poorer countries versus richer countries (not 
shown here) – in line with the notion that, due to greater complementarities, the aggregate “immigration 
                                                      
67 See Bauer, Poole, and Dexter 1972, 103; and Schneider 1985, 932. 
68 The question is: “Would you say it is generally bad or good for [respondent’s country]’s economy that people 
come to live here from other countries?” The answers are coded on a scale from 0=bad, to 10=good. 
69 Again, one might raise the question here about whether these measured beliefs about the welfare effects of 
immigration should be considered as causes of preferences regarding immigration inflows, rather than as simple 
correlates of those preferences. Given the available (cross-sectional) data, we do not claim to demonstrate causal 
effects here but aim to show the plausibility of an informational account for some of the link between education and 
on attitudes toward immigration. 
  29surplus” should be larger the more immigrants differ from natives in their skill endowments. More 
importantly, including ECONOMY in the model further reduces the residual effect of education by about 
9 percentage points (to only 0.12) and slightly increases the explanatory power of the model. This 
suggests that “economic literacy,” largely a product of higher education, may account for a component of 
the general link between education and attitudes toward immigration that is quite separate from cultural 
predictors. 
Overall, the measured differences in cultural values and economic literacy across respondents 
thus appear to account for some 65% of the uncontrolled education effect. The residual education effect is 
even further reduced (and falls to 0.11) once we also add our SKILL345 proxy to the model (column 8).
70  
VI. Robustness Tests 
 
  We have conducted a large variety of additional tests. We focused on two issues: whether the 
various indicators of cultural values and beliefs are actually endogenous to concerns about the labor 
market; and whether the core findings are robust to changes in the specification of the model, including 
the addition of a larger variety of controls.
 71  
1. Endogenous Values and Beliefs? One possibility we have also examined is that the connection noted 
above between education levels and cultural variables like racism and tolerance might itself be, at least in 
part, a function of labor-market concerns. Perhaps fear of competition for jobs with foreigners and 
minorities makes less-educated individuals generally more racist and less tolerant, and thus more opposed 
to immigration, without regard for how likely it is that particular types of immigrants will actually 
compete for the same jobs as them. To test this idea, we examined whether the effects of education (or 
skill) levels on racism and tolerance among respondents in the labor force differ significantly from the 
effects of these variables among those not currently in the labor force. If the connection is influenced by 
                                                      
70 Note that, while the independent effect of skills (as measured by SKILL345) is still significant here, it is 
minuscule: a shift from low to high skills is associated with an increase in the probability of favoring immigration by 
only 0.03. And as we have reported above, this link is always positive (and almost identical in magnitude) 
regardless of where the immigrants come from (a finding that does not fit with the simple labor-market competition 
account. 
71 Results, replication data, and code for all sensitivity tests reported here are available in a supplement to this paper 
available at the authors’ website. 
  30concerns about labor market competition, it should be significantly stronger among those currently in the 
labor force than among other groups. We again split the ESS sample according to whether people are 
currently in “paid work” or not and then estimated levels of the ANTIHATE and 
MULTICULTURALISM variables using EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT and SKILL345 as predictors 
for both sub-samples. We found no significant difference in the size or significance of the estimated 
effects of education and skills on these cultural variables across the sub-samples. This finding strongly 
suggests that concerns about job competition are not a primary factor in explaining the connection 
between education levels and racism or tolerance. 
2. Alternative Specifications. We have performed a variety of additional tests to gauge whether our key 
findings are robust to alternative specifications of the model, alternative measurements of a range of 
variables, and for various sub-samples of survey respondents. One straightforward test involves removing 
the restriction that the economic threat posed by immigration will be felt equally by respondents, 
regardless of where they live in their home country. If we allow that the labor market can be segmented 
into geographically separate local markets, the wage effects of immigration may be significantly larger in 
immigrant “gateway communities” than elsewhere. To allow for this possibility, we interacted each of the 
education variables with the MINORITY AREA variable, which reflects the concentration of ethnic and 
racial minorities in the area in which the respondent resides. The results are inconclusive at best.
72 We 
found no significant interaction effects along these lines except for the cases of immigration from richer 
European countries, where the impact of education on support for immigration is significantly weaker in 
minority areas than in other locations (though the substantive differences are small). In these latter cases, 
the effects of education remain positive and substantively large in all areas, which is inconsistent with the 
expectations from the simple labour market competition account. 
We also estimated a series of ordered probit models to check whether our results are sensitive to 
the choice of the cut-off point specified for the dichotomous dependent variables. The results show that 
                                                      
72 Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) tested for similar effects using data on immigration preferences (and the geographic 
concentration of immigrants) in the United States, finding no significant area effects. 
  31this possibility can be clearly rejected: the estimated effects of education remain positive, statistically 
significant, and substantively large in magnitude across all estimations of the benchmark model. We also 
simply re-ran all the analysis reported above using all alternative cut-off points for dichotomization of the 
dependent variable, and found that none of the core results were altered.
73  
Finally, we tested whether the core results reported above were affected when we added a 
comprehensive set of additional control variables to the main benchmark variables and the measures of 
cultural values we incorporated in the estimations in sections IV and V. We experimented with a variety 
of “belief” variables (including respondents’ concerns about refugees, free market attitudes, altruism, 
traditionalism, and the importance attached to equality). We controlled for indicators of trade union 
membership, religion, and various proxies of social capital and interpersonal trust. And finally we 
controlled for various measures of economic insecurity or risk, including skill specificity, occupational 
unemployment, past unemployment, current unemployment, and (an inverse measure of risk) job 
mobility. Perhaps most significantly here, we found that while more educated respondents are less likely 
to be unemployed or to have experienced unemployment in the recent past, and they are also more mobile 
in the labor market (measured by their self-assessed chances of finding a new job with another employer), 
these relationships are quite small in magnitude, and controlling for such measures of economic risk has 
no impact on the results of our tests. We also re-estimated both all full sample estimations and all single 
country models including regional fixed effects (in addition to the country fixed effects) to control for 
unobserved characteristics of location (e.g. proximity to a border, economic recession) that might 
potentially affect attitudes toward immigration. None of the additions to the model affected the main 
findings: most importantly, all estimated coefficients for the education variables retained their (positive) 
                                                      
73 We also experimented with dependent variables measuring for each individual respondent the differences in 
attitudes toward immigrants from richer and poorer countries. At first glance this might seem to provide the simplest 
approach testing the labor market competition argument: individuals more in favor of immigration from rich vs. 
poor countries (that is, more in favor of high- vs. low-skilled immigration) should have relatively lower levels of 
skills (education). But we found these variables rather more difficult to interpret and analyze than the basic pro- vs. 
anti-immigration dependent variables we used in the main analysis. The major problem came with making 
assumptions about the intervals between response categories. Should one assume that the difference between an 
answer of, say, “allow many” and “allow some” immigrants is the same as the difference between “allow few” and 
“allow none”? There seemed to be a wide range of ways to proceed here, with no obvious best approach.  
  32signs and their significance in all the full-sample estimations. 
VII. Conclusions 
 
The main question we have addressed in this paper is whether opposition to immigration in 
Europe, most apparent among the less educated, is driven to a large degree by fears of labor market 
competition. This interpretation – applied to Europe, and to other advanced economies – is fast becoming 
an accepted, political-economy wisdom.
74 The best available survey evidence we have, from the 2003 
ESS, does not support this explanation at all. Our results indicate that, in contrast to what would be 
expected from conventional arguments about labor market competition, people with higher education 
levels are more likely to favor immigration regardless of where the immigrants come from and their likely 
skill attributes. The same relationship holds if we consider the occupational measures of the skill levels of 
respondents rather than their educational qualifications, and it is essentially unchanged regardless of 
whether we examine respondents who are in the labor force or those not in the labor force. The findings 
thus suggest that the relationship between education and views about immigration actually has very little 
to do with competition for jobs. This conclusion should not really be a surprise given that the most 
sophisticated economic models are equivocal about whether immigrants will have an adverse effect on the 
real earnings of native workers, and a growing body of empirical research shows that the actual effects of 
immigration flows on income, employment, and unemployment are quite small. From this perspective, 
our findings actually fit well with expectations from the best available economic theory and evidence.  
This conventional story about labor market competition and anti-immigration sentiments appears 
to rest on an unfortunate misreading of the available evidence. We find more support for alternative 
claims that anti-immigration sentiments are associated instead with values and beliefs that foster 
animosity toward foreigners and foreign cultures and that are most prevalent among less-educated 
individuals. The data indicate that more-educated respondents are significantly less racist and place far 
greater value on cultural diversity in society, and they are also more likely to believe that immigration 
                                                      
74 See Borjas 1999a; Scheve and Slaughter 2001a, 2001b; and Mayda 2004. 
  33generates benefits for their national economy as a whole. Together, these associated values and beliefs 
account for around 65% of the estimated link between education and support for immigration. 
The picture that emerges is not an especially rosy one for those who support immigration and 
worry about the growth of extremist, often violent, anti-immigrant movements in Europe. If anti-
immigration sentiments were primarily a function of economic fears among native workers, it would be 
reasonably easy to imagine ways to mitigate them by targeting financial assistance and job-creation 
programs toward the individuals (and communities) facing the greatest potential costs. But this is not a 
conclusion supported by the evidence. Anti-immigration sentiments appear to be far more powerfully 
associated with cultural values that have more to do with conceptions of national identity than they do 
with concerns about personal, economic circumstances. Others have reached broadly similar conclusions 
using different types of measures from survey data gathered in particular countries.
75 Here we have 
shown that the basic result holds generally (across all European nations), even taking into account 
differences in the skill attributes of immigrants from different source countries, and we have highlighted 
the role played by education in demarcating the cultural division that separates those individuals most 
likely to see immigration as a cultural threat and those likely to see immigration instead as a cultural 
boon.  
The big question which follows logically, but which we do not attempt to answer here, has to do 
with just how deep this cultural division goes. It would be trite and misleading to suggest that more or 
better education is “the answer” for those interested in alleviating anti-immigration and anti-foreigner 
sentiment. To the extent that these types of attitudes are due to misunderstandings and misperceptions 
about foreigners (i.e., incomplete or biased information), then certainly we can expect that improvements 
in education may help to reduce support for exclusionary policies and alleviate tensions between natives 
and immigrants. And to the extent that education actually transforms the values held by individuals, 
encouraging them to have more tolerant, pro-outsider views of the world, focusing on the education 
                                                      
75 See, for example, Citrin et al. 1997; Dustmann and Preston 2001; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Hooghe and Marks 
2003; and Sniderman et al. 2004. 
  34system for long-term solutions to cultural conflict is wise. But we must be careful not to understate the 
cultural gap we are seeing in the data. Immigration brings to the fore very different conceptions of 
national identity – involving different views about the importance of ethnicity, religion, and language – 
which may be, to degrees still unknown, immutable and irreconcilable. The educational differences we 
can observe between those individuals holding more pro-and anti-outsider views of the world may be 
more of a symptom of the cultural divide between the two groups than it is a cause.     
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  39Table 1: Education Levels of Immigrants from Richer/Poorer Countries and Natives 
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1. Richer/Poorer European/Non-European source countries are defined as countries that fall above/below the sample mean in the respective 
GDP per capita distribution of the 51 European/Non-European origin countries available in the International File of Immigration Surveys 
Database (Van Tubergen 2004). See the supplement to this paper for more detailed analysis and additional tests of the differences in 
education levels among immigrants from richer and poorer source countries. 
2. The average education score is computed as the mean of a discrete attainment variable coded Low Education=1, Middle Education=2, 
High Education=3. 
3. Differences are assessed using two-sample t-tests (two-tailed) with unequal variances assumed. All differences in means are significant at 
the 0.99 confidence level. 
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many  Missing Total 
Mean  Std Dev. 
4,048 11,936 17,946 6,336  2,035  42,302
Richer European Countries 
9.57 28.22 42.42 14.98  4.81  % 
0.603 0.489 
3,617 13,759 18,306 4,904  1,717  42,302
Poorer European Countries 
8.55 32.53 43.27 11.59  4.06  % 
0.572 0.495 
4,466 13,178 17,351 5,256  2,050  42,302 Richer Countries Outside 
Europe  10.56 31.15 41.02 12.43  4.85  % 
0.562 0.496 
4,316 14,670 17,127 4,364  1,826  42,302 Poorer Countries Outside 
Europe  10.20 34.68 40.49 10.32  4.32  % 
0.531 0.499 
Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. 
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Table 3: Immigration Preferences by Source: Individual ESS Countries 
 
 
Means of Dichotomous Dependent Variables: 
 
Favor Immigration from … 
  









Outside Europe  Obs.
1 GDP per 
capita
2
Luxembourg  0.52 0.51 0.49 0.47  1,370  56,290 
Norway  0.62 0.66 0.54 0.60  2,017  35,132 
Ireland  0.68 0.68 0.62 0.64  1,964  30,100 
Denmark  0.69 0.56 0.59 0.46  1,415  29,306 
Switzerland  0.69 0.73 0.63 0.69  1,947  28,128 
Austria  0.43 0.39 0.37 0.35  2,063  28,009 
Netherlands  0.54 0.58 0.50 0.56  2,312  27,071 
Belgium  0.61 0.62 0.55 0.56  1,843  26,435 
Germany  0.65 0.64 0.61 0.59  2,841  26,067 
France  0.57 0.57 0.48 0.51  1,448  25,318 
Finland  0.50 0.46 0.41 0.40  1,940  25,155 
Italy  0.69 0.65 0.68 0.62  1,141  24,936 
United  Kingdom  0.56 0.53 0.51 0.49  2,020  24,694 
Sweden  0.79 0.87 0.75 0.85  1,900  24,525 
Israel  0.74 0.58 0.72 0.55  2,261  20,597 
Spain  0.55 0.51 0.53 0.49  1,557  19,965 
Portugal  0.43 0.39 0.43 0.38  1,405  17,310 
Greece  0.33 0.16 0.27 0.14  2,459  16,657 
Slovenia  0.69 0.59 0.64 0.57  1,452  16,613 
Czech  Republic  0.66 0.54 0.65 0.51  1,262  13,997 
Hungary  0.30 0.16 0.24 0.12  1,531  12,623 
Poland  0.68 0.59 0.66 0.57  1,971  9,935 
1 Mean number of observations for the four dependent variables.  
2 GDP per capita, PPP current international dollars for the year 2000. Source: World Development Indicators 2003. 
  Cases weighted by DWEIGHT. 
  41Table 4: Education and Support for Immigration: Benchmark Results for Full Sample 
Educational attainment    Years of Schooling 
Dependent variable: Favor 



































0.061***          
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)           
YEARS OF SCHOOLING            0.022***  0.022***  0.023***  0.024*** 
           (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
AGE  -0.001***  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.003***   -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
GENDER  -0.048***  0.008 -0.027**  0.006    -0.044*** 0.012 -0.023**  0.011 
  (0.013)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.012)   (0.013)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.012) 
INCOME  0.019***  0.015*** 0.016***  0.013***    0.021***  0.017*** 0.018***  0.014*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002)  (0.003) 
NATIVE  -0.086***  -0.098*** -0.079***  -0.084***   -0.087*** -0.101*** -0.079***  -0.087*** 
  (0.018)  (0.022) (0.016)  (0.022)   (0.017)  (0.020) (0.015)  (0.020) 
MINORITY  AREA  0.007  0.030***  0.006  0.028***  0.010  0.033***  0.008  0.031*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.008)   (0.008)  (0.009) (0.009)  (0.008) 
PARTISAN  RIGHT  -0.005  -0.021*** -0.010***  -0.023***    -0.005* -0.021*** -0.009***  -0.023*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
                 
Observations  28733  28878 28671  28761   28648  28795 28586  28677 
Log  likelihood  -17800.48  -17802.68 -18141.87  -18054.65   -17769.55 -17759.48 -18106.51  -17982.56 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.07 0.09  0.07  0.09   0.07 0.09  0.07  0.09 
1.  Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the 
value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in 
the probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses.  
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.  Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by 
DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.  
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Outside  Poorer Outside  
Country         Obs.  (avg)         Obs.  (avg) 
Luxembourg  0.052***  0.036*** 0.041***  0.037***  700  0.023***  0.018*** 0.020***  0.020***  697 
 (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013) (0.013)    (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)   
Norway  0.085***  0.054*** 0.090***  0.067***  1891  0.028***  0.018*** 0.033***  0.023***  1913 
 (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.018) (0.013)    (0.007) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.003)   
Ireland  0.049***  0.053*** 0.048***  0.049***  1379  0.026***  0.019*** 0.023***  0.022***  1350 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.010) (0.008)    (0.005) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)   
Denmark  0.090***  0.101*** 0.106***  0.088***  1185  0.031***  0.033*** 0.033***  0.027***  1185 
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.018) (0.013)    (0.004) (0.004)  (0.006) (0.006)   
Switzerland  0.081***  0.049*** 0.071***  0.058***  1450  0.034***  0.023*** 0.034***  0.023***  1449 
 (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.019) (0.008)    (0.004) (0.003)  (0.006) (0.006)   
Austria  0.075***  0.067*** 0.069***  0.057***  1224  0.037***  0.033*** 0.030***  0.027***  1208 
 (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.011) (0.015)    (0.005) (0.004)  (0.004) (0.005)   
Netherlands  0.070***  0.062*** 0.066***  0.064***  1934  0.017***  0.023*** 0.019***  0.021***  1921 
 (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.006) (0.009)    (0.004) (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)   
Belgium  0.066***  0.066*** 0.072***  0.070***  1243  0.025***  0.027*** 0.025***  0.032***  1248 
 (0.019)  (0.004)  (0.017) (0.013)    (0.009) (0.003)  (0.009) (0.006)   
Germany  0.052***  0.052*** 0.070***  0.061***  2155  0.019***  0.022*** 0.026***  0.028***  2152 
 (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.007) (0.011)    (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.004)   
France  0.052***  0.056*** 0.063***  0.051***  1176  0.021***  0.022*** 0.028***  0.024***  1163 
 (0.010)  (0.014)  (0.012) (0.010)    (0.006) (0.008)  (0.007) (0.006)   
Finland  0.066***  0.059*** 0.064***  0.064***  1679  0.028***  0.027*** 0.029***  0.026***  1683 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008) (0.007)    (0.001) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.004)   
Italy  0.047*** 0.026  0.045**  0.046**  512  0.014*** 0.009  0.014***  0.015***  511 
 (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.018) (0.019)    (0.004) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.003)   
United  Kingdom  0.100***  0.109*** 0.087***  0.102***  1612  0.038***  0.036*** 0.030***  0.034***  1605 
 (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.013) (0.017)    (0.006) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.005)   
Sweden  0.058***  0.031*** 0.056***  0.035***  1709  0.032***  0.014*** 0.033***  0.018***  1708 
 (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) (0.005)    (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)   
Israel 0.032**  0.038**  0.025**  0.038  1576 0.010*  0.015* 0.008  0.014  1538 
 (0.013)  (0.018)  (0.012) (0.023)    (0.006) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.009)   
Spain  0.033*** 0.025  0.026  0.034*  799  0.013*** 0.010  0.009  0.012  762 
 (0.012)  (0.020)  (0.017) (0.020)    (0.005) (0.008)  (0.006) (0.007)   
Portugal 0.046* 0.027  0.032  0.027*  802  0.017**  0.011* 0.013*  0.011*  802 
 (0.025)  (0.017)  (0.021) (0.014)    (0.008) (0.006)  (0.008) (0.006)   
Greece 0.028**  0.034***  0.028*** 0.030*** 1425  0.010*** 0.012*** 0.010***  0.011***  1425 
 (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.011) (0.006)    (0.004) (0.002)  (0.004) (0.002)   
Slovenia  0.054***  0.071*** 0.061***  0.051**  957  0.017***  0.025*** 0.023***  0.020***  970 
 (0.013)  (0.022)  (0.019) (0.022)    (0.005) (0.007)  (0.007) (0.006)   
Czech Republic  0.063***  0.075**  0.077***  0.089***  831  0.023***  0.037***  0.025***  0.036***  822 
 (0.022)  (0.032)  (0.024) (0.027)    (0.006) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.007)   
Hungary 0.035**  0.012** 0.023**  0.011*  1103 0.016***  0.005* 0.014**  0.004  1143 
 (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.011) (0.007)    (0.006) (0.003)  (0.005) (0.004)   
Poland  0.075***  0.073*** 0.069***  0.070***  1421  0.035***  0.032*** 0.033***  0.032***  1423 
 (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.011) (0.009)    (0.005) (0.004)  (0.005) (0.004)   
Total (of 22) 
Positive Coeff.  22  22 22  22    22  22 22  22   
Total sig. (p<.1)  22  19  20  21    22 20  20  19   
Total sig. if 
drop
2 (p<.1)  22  21 21  20    21  21 20  20   
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the 
value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the 
probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses.  * p<0.10 
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01 Each cell displays results from a separate country specific estimation of our benchmark model with one of the 
four dependent variables and either educational attainment or schooling on the RHS alongside a full set of benchmark controls 
(coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT. 
2. The last row in the table counts the number of significant coefficients if the INCOME variable, the central bottleneck in terms of number of 
observations for most countries, is replaced by a variable measuring satisfaction with the current level of household income. The latter variable 
(see text fn. 46 for discussion) yields on average about 20-40% more observations per country 
  43Figure 1: GDP per capita and the Effect of Education on Attitudes Toward Immigration: 
Marginal effects of educational attainment on support for immigration
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Immigration from Richer Countries Outside Europe; R^2=0.24 




1. Regression equations; standard errors in parentheses: 
 
Immigration from Poorer Countries Outside Europe:    Ŷ =   0.030 +   0.00000107 GDP 
        (0.00000088) 
 
Immigration from Richer Countries Outside Europe:    Ŷ =   0.019 +     0.00000174 GDP ** 
  (0.000000713) 
 
The chart excludes Luxemburg, which is a clear outlier in terms of GDP per capita. Note that the pattern looks substantively 





  44Table 6: Skill-Level and Immigration Preference by Source: Full ESS Sample 
 
High/Low Skill Distinction    Disaggregated Skill Levels 
Dependent variable: Favor 

































0.149***          
 (0.011)  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.009)           
SKILL2           0.060***  0.031*  0.031*  0.042** 
           (0.019)  (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) 
SKILL3           0.159***  0.133***  0.134***  0.145*** 
           (0.022)  (0.018) (0.021) (0.019) 
SKILL4           0.232***  0.216***  0.218***  0.235*** 
           (0.016)  (0.017) (0.019) (0.019) 
SKILL5           0.163***  0.145***  0.146***  0.164*** 
           (0.018)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
AGE -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003***    -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
GENDER -0.037***  0.016*  -0.018*  0.020*    -0.036***  0.017*  -0.017  0.021** 
 (0.011)  (0.009)  (0.011) (0.010)    (0.012) (0.010)  (0.011) (0.010) 
INCOME 0.020***  0.019***  0.018***  0.017***    0.019***  0.018***  0.016***  0.015*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
NATIVE -0.074***  -0.082***  -0.078***  -0.074***    -0.073***  -0.081***  -0.076***  -0.073*** 
 (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.019) (0.021)    (0.021) (0.019)  (0.019) (0.021) 
MINORITY AREA  0.006  0.035***  0.004  0.030***    0.007  0.036***  0.005  0.031*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.009)    (0.010) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.009) 
PARTISAN RIGHT  -0.007**  -0.023***  -0.009***  -0.024***    -0.006**  -0.022***  -0.008***  -0.024*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.003) (0.003)    (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
                  
Observations 25100  25231  25045  25125    25100  25231  25045  25125 
Log likelihood  -15562.88  -15554.80  -15902.44  -15812.86    -15513.27  -15517.76  -15864.30  -15770.57 
Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.09    0.07  0.09  0.07  0.09 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the 
value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the 
probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. * p<0.10 
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT 
and PWEIGHT.  
 
  
  45Table 7: Skill-level, Education, and Immigration Attitudes by Source: Full ESS Sample 
 
High/Low Skill Distinction and Educational 
Attainment 
Disaggregated Skill Levels and Educational 
Attainment 
Dependent variable: Favor 












































  (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) 
SKILL345  0.089*** 0.083***  0.085***  0.085***         
 (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.011)         
SKILL2         0.040**  0.011  0.011  0.021 
         (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
SKILL3         0.112***  0.081***  0.082***  0.090*** 
         (0.025)  (0.020)  (0.024)  (0.020) 
SKILL4         0.152***  0.123***  0.128***  0.138*** 
         (0.023)  (0.021)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
SKILL5         0.106***  0.082***  0.084***  0.097*** 
         (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.022)  (0.022) 
AGE  -0.001***  -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002***  -0.002*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
GENDER  -0.034***  0.019* -0.016  0.023**  -0.034*** 0.019* -0.016  0.023** 
  (0.012)  (0.010) (0.011)  (0.011) (0.012)  (0.010) (0.012)  (0.011) 
INCOME  0.015***  0.014*** 0.012***  0.011*** 0.015***  0.013*** 0.012***  0.011*** 
  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) 
NATIVE  -0.063***  -0.071*** -0.067***  -0.062*** -0.063*** -0.071*** -0.066***  -0.062*** 
  (0.021)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.020) (0.021)  (0.019) (0.019)  (0.020) 
MINORITY  AREA  0.006  0.035*** 0.004  0.031*** 0.006  0.035*** 0.004  0.031*** 
  (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.009) (0.010)  (0.010) (0.010)  (0.009) 
PARTISAN  RIGHT  -0.006**  -0.023*** -0.009***  -0.024***  -0.006**  -0.022*** -0.008***  -0.024*** 
  (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.004) (0.003)  (0.003) 
              
Observations  24996  25126 24941  25021 24996  25126 24941  25021 
Log  likelihood  -15355.29  -15345.64 -15698.06  -15599.89 -15340.29 -15338.31 -15689.72  -15590.49 
Pseudo  R-squared  0.07  0.10 0.07  0.09 0.07  0.10 0.07  0.10 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the value of the 
relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is reported for 
binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a 
full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT.
  46Table 8: Skill-level, Education, and Immigration Attitudes by Source: 
In- and Out-of- Labor Force Sub-Samples 
 
  Dependent Variable
1: Favor Immigration from … 




Full ESS sample        
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  0.059***  0.059***  0.062***  0.061*** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Observations 28733  28878  28671  28761 
Log likelihood  -17800.48  -17802.68  -18141.87  -18054.65 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.09 
In Labor Force Sample
2       
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  0.068***  0.065***  0.067***  0.064*** 
 (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Observations 17655  17724  17624  17660 
Log likelihood  -10643.05  -10745.19  -10996.92  -11038.37 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.08 
Out of Labor Force Sample
3       
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  0.047***  0.051***  0.054***  0.056*** 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.007) 
Observations 11078  11154  11047  11101 
Log likelihood  -7105.56  -7006.67  -7097.49  -6975.46 
Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.09  0.07  0.09 
Unemployed (all)        
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  0.068***  0.039**  0.073***  0.049** 
 (0.019)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.021) 
Observations 1575  1579  1567  1570 
Log likelihood  -991.23  -997.32  -982.64  -1005.13 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.08  0.09  0.08 
Unemployed and Actively Looking for Work        
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  0.058**  0.035  0.078***  0.056** 
 (0.024)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.024) 
Observations 1010  1013  1008  1007 
Log likelihood  -647.44  -633.76  -641.85  -639.13 
Pseudo R-squared  0.06  0.10  0.07  0.08 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the value of 
the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the probability is 
reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. 
Each model includes a full set of benchmark controls and country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and 
PWEIGHT. 
2. Includes those currently employed in paid work and those temporarily unemployed. 
3. Includes those permanently disabled or retired, students, and those doing housework and caring for children at home. 
 
 
  47Table 9: The College “Plateau” Effect in Attitudes Toward Immigration 
  Dependent Variable: Favor Immigration from … 





1 1 2  3  4 
ELEMENTARY -0.055***  -0.061***  -0.077***  -0.092*** 
 (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.019) 
HIGHSCHOOL 0.056***  0.029**  0.043***  0.016 
 (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.016) 
COLLEGE 0.172***  0.175***  0.175***  0.166*** 
 (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.017) 
PHD 0.221***  0.197***  0.220***  0.189*** 
 (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.031)  (0.028) 
AGE -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
GENDER -0.049***  0.007  -0.028**  0.006 
 (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
INCOME 0.020***  0.017***  0.017***  0.015*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
NATIVE -0.084***  -0.095***  -0.076***  -0.082*** 
 (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.022) 
MINORITY AREA  0.008  0.031***  0.007  0.029*** 
 (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008) 
PARTISAN RIGHT  -0.005  -0.021***  -0.010***  -0.023*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
        
Observations 28733  28878  28671  28761 
Log likelihood  -17801.73  -17823.18  -18156.61  -18090.36 
Pseudo R-squared  0.07  0.09  0.07  0.09 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the 
value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the 
probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. * p<0.10 
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT 
and PWEIGHT. 
 








IMMIGRANT FRIENDS 0.22 0.21 
CRIME  -0.10 -0.11 
ANTIHATE  0.13 0.12 
CULTURE  0.23 0.22 
MULTICULTURALISM 0.23 0.24 
 
* Correlation coefficients for the full ESS sample. All correlations are significant at the .99 level. 
              Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. 
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  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
ANTIHATE    0.018*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
    (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
MULTICULTURALISM      0.109*** 0.104*** 0.072*** 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 
      (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
IMMIGRANT 
FRIENDS        0.089*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 
        (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
CULTURE          0.058*** 0.049*** 0.034*** 0.035*** 
          (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
CRIME        -0.037*** -0.027***  -0.030***
        (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
ECONOMY        0.044***  0.042*** 
         (0.003)  (0.003) 
SKILL345          0.036*** 
          (0.011) 
AGE  -0.002***  -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001  -0.001**  -0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GENDER  0.008 0.007 -0.001 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.012  0.024** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
INCOME  0.015*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.010*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
NATIVE -0.098***  -0.092*** -0.077*** -0.029  -0.003  0.007  0.030  0.053*** 
  (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) 
MINORITY AREA  0.030***  0.032***  0.023***  0.011  0.012  0.014  0.015*  0.023** 
  (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
PARTISAN RIGHT  -0.021***  -0.020*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.007**  -0.006*  -0.006*  -0.011***
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
          
Observations  28878 28080 27974 27920 27310 26910 26374 22965 
Log likelihood  -17802.68  -17130.99 -16406.86 -16204.24 -15136.53 -14712.97 -14108.84  -12232.75
Pseudo  R-squared 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.21 
1. Probit estimations: coefficients are estimated marginal effects (∂F/∂xk), i.e. the marginal effect on Pr(y=1) given a unit increase in the 
value of the relevant (continuous) regressor (xk), holding all other regressors at their respective sample means. The discrete change in the 
probability is reported for binary regressors. Robust standard errors, adjusted for potential regional clustering, in parentheses. * p<0.10 
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each model includes a full set of country dummies (coefficients not shown here). Cases weighted by DWEIGHT 
and PWEIGHT.  
  49  50
Appendix: Summary Statistics 













EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT  41988  2.82  1.47  0  6 
YEARS OF SCHOOLING  41662  11.81  4.13  0  40 
ELEMENTARY 41988  0.12  0.33  0  1 
HIGHSCHOOL 41988  0.30  0.46  0  1 
COLLEGE 41988  0.13  0.34  0  1 
PHD 41988  0.05  0.21  0  1 
SKILL345 35358  0.35  0.48  0  1 
SKILL1 35358  0.12  0.33  0  1 
SKILL2 35358  0.53  0.50  0  1 
SKILL3 35358  0.16  0.36  0  1 
SKILL4 35358  0.12  0.32  0  1 
SKILL5 35358  0.07  0.26  0  1 
AGE 42044  46.46  18.06  16  110 
GENDER 42247  0.52  0.50  0  1 
INCOME 33652  5.92  2.44  1  12 
NATIVE 42220  0.93  0.26  0  1 
IMMIGRANT FRIENDS  42052  1.61  0.73  1  3 
MINORITY AREA  41457  1.66  0.68  1  3 
PARTISAN RIGHT  37117  4.92  2.16  0  10 
CRIME 40666  6.77  2.08  0  10 
ANTIHATE 39940  7.11  3.08  0  10 
CULTURE 39919  5.65  2.42  0  10 
MULTICULTURALISM 41587  2.65  1.12  1  5 
ECONOMY 39723  4.96  2.30  0  10 
    Cases weighted by DWEIGHT and PWEIGHT. 
 






















EGE  PHD crime Anti-
hate  culture  Multi-
culti 
EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT  1 . 0 0                         
YEARS OF 
SCHOOLING  0.78  1.00                       
AGE  -0.19  -0.28  1.00                      
GENDER  0.00  0.00  -0.02  1.00                     
INCOME 0.34  0.30  -0.14  -0.06  1.00                    
NATIVE  -0.08  -0.05  0.00  -0.02  -0.02  1.00                   
IMMIGRANT 
FRIENDS  0.21  0.19  -0.18  -0.02  0.20  -0.25  1.00                  
MINORITY  AREA  0.02  0.00  -0.06  0.02  0.01  -0.11  0.17  1.00                 
PARTISAN  RIGHT  -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.05  -0.07  1.00                
SKILL5  0.14 0.12 0.07 -0.12 0.13 0.00 0.03 -0.02  0.05  1.00               
SKILL4  0.46 0.41 -0.02 0.02 0.19 -0.04 0.12 0.00  -0.03  -0.13  1.00              
SKILL3  0.14 0.12 -0.02 0.07 0.11  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.01  -0.14  -0.19  1.00             
SKILL2  -0.39 -0.33 -0.02 -0.02 -0.21 0.03 -0.12 -0.01  -0.01  -0.32  -0.42  -0.45  1.00            
SKILL2  -0.23 -0.22 0.01  0.05 -0.15 -0.02 -0.04 0.02 -0.01  -0.10  -0.13  -0.14  -0.31  1.00           
SKILL345  0.53 0.46 0.01 0.00 0.30 -0.01 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.51 0.54 -0.84  -0.26  1.00          
ELEMENTARY  -0.50 -0.44 0.20 -0.01 -0.21 0.02 -0.10 -0.03 -0.01  -0.06  -0.13  -0.11  0.12  0.15  -0.21  1.00         
HIGHSCHOOL -0.08  -0.01  -0.11  0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.03  -0.19 0.05 0.15 -0.05  -0.12  -0.25  1.00        
COLLEGE  0.57 0.45 -0.05 0.01 0.21 -0.02 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.34 0.08 -0.29  -0.12 0.37 -0.15 -0.34 1.00           
PHD  0.52 0.37 -0.02 -0.01 0.12 -0.08 0.13 -0.01 -0.02 0.07  0.32 -0.01 -0.22 -0.08 0.27 -0.09 -0.20 -0.12 1.00         
CRIME  -0.13 -0.14 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 0.07 -0.13 0.00 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.02 0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.08 1.00       
ANTIHATE  0.14 0.15 -0.10 0.00 0.05 -0.04 0.11 0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.10 0.02 -0.08  -0.03 0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.10 0.08 -0.10 1.00     
CULTURE  0.24 0.24 -0.09 0.03 0.17 -0.10 0.24 -0.01 -0.09 0.04 0.16 0.07 -0.15 -0.07 0.19 -0.09 -0.02 0.15 0.14 -0.33 0.19 1.00   
MULTI 
CULTURALISM  0.25 0.25 -0.16 0.06 0.22 -0.05 0.22 0.08 -0.13 0.03 0.15 0.07 -0.14 -0.07 0.18 -0.15 0.00 0.15 0.11 -0.24 0.15 0.37 1.00 
ECONOMY  0.22 0.21 -0.02 -0.06 0.18 -0.13 0.23 0.04 -0.07 0.05 0.14 0.06 -0.14 -0.07 0.18 -0.09 -0.01 0.13 0.13 -0.36 0.14 0.55 0.29 
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